Regime Change and Intervention
With the outbreak of popular protests in Dey 1404 (December 2025 to January 2026), initially triggered by severe economic conditions, rising inflation, currency volatility, and market instability, the central demand of the protesters quickly shifted toward the complete overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, the regime was forced to fight for its survival on two simultaneous fronts: the domestic front against protesters and the external front involving pressure from Western powers regarding missile and nuclear issues.
In suppressing the protests, the Islamic Republic employed a pattern based on communication shutdowns, mass killings, arrests, and widespread intimidation, a method previously used during the protests of 2019 and 2022. However, what distinguished the 1404 protests was the far greater scale of bloodshed that occurred this time.
The people’s demands include the overthrow of the regime, democratic transition, and normalization of relations with the international community. In this context, U.S. President Donald Trump warned the regime against cracking down on protesters. Nevertheless, disregarding these warnings, the regime imposed a two day internet shutdown and carried out large scale killings, reportedly exceeding 20,000 people.
Today, a significant portion of Iranians both inside and outside the country are calling for military action by Western governments, NATO, and the United States to fully dismantle the Islamic Republic, similar to what occurred in Libya and Iraq. Although some argue that democracy cannot be achieved through military intervention, under current conditions this claim appears increasingly detached from reality.
A close examination of the Islamic Republic’s security oriented approach indicates that the security apparatus and ruling elites have acted cohesively, with no visible deep fractures at the top. Moreover, the primary instrument of repression is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a military and ideological force that has tied its survival to that of the entire system. Therefore, the scenario of the army withdrawing, as seen in many revolutions, appears unlikely in this case.
Although cohesion in authoritarian systems does not necessarily mean the absence of internal divisions and crises often expose hidden fractures, even if splits were to emerge within the power structure, expecting an automatic transition to a democratic and secular government would remain difficult.
On the other hand, while foreign intervention might lead to the regime’s collapse, it also carries the risk of civil war, a point frequently raised by regime supporters to intimidate opponents. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that transitioning from a totalitarian system rarely occurs without cost or violence, and at certain moments such costs may become unavoidable.
At the same time, contemporary Iranian society possesses institutional and organizational capacities that could help manage a potential power vacuum. Prince Reza Pahlavi has been recognized by many activists and citizens as a transitional leader and has significantly consolidated his social base, even among some who were previously opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty.